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The 'Right to Die' : 
Legislative and Judicial Developments 
Dennis J. Horan 
Mr. Horan is chairman of the Right to Live /Right to Die Committee 
of the A merican Bar Association and gave this talk to the medicine 
and law committee of the Association at its annual meeting in 1977. 
One of the legal dilemmas of our electronic age is too much unnec-
essary legislation enacted too soon and in response to too many non-
problems. This is especially true in the legal-medical area where physi-
cians are slowly being hemmed in by such legislation and are finding 
themse lves unable to practice their art and to exercise their best 
judgment in doing so . Living Will or Natural Death legislation is a 
typical example of that phenomenon. 
California recently passed a Living Will provision entitled "The 
Natural Death Act."l Seven other states have followed suit, but with 
variable approaches.2 Although hailed by many as a necessary and 
important piece of legislation giving another fundamental freedom to 
persons and protection to physicians, in fact, it gives nothing to per-
sons which they do not already possess under the law, nor does it add 
any additional legal protection to doctors which they do not already 
possess . The immunity granted by the bill may be of doubtful consti-
t utional validity and is certainly a doubtfully meritorious statement of 
public policy when one considers that there exist no reported cases of 
either criminal or civi l liability against doctors arising out of the term-
ination of treatment to terminal patients. If anything, the California 
bill adds officious burdens to the death bed, encumbers medical deci-
sions with unnecessary additional consultations and creates, rather 
than clarifies, legal problems. 
The Californ ia Act does not allow or hasten mercy killing, which is 
strictly prohibited either by active means or by mere omission. Some 
have argued that living will legislation is the opening wedge towards 
the ultimate legalization of euthanasia . 3 Since this legislation, in itself, 
adds nothing to the legal rights people already possess under the law, 
nor gives physicians additional protections not already possessed (pre-
suming an absence of homicidal intent), there may be some truth in 
this charge. For example, Prof. Yale Kamisar points out in his famous 
article 4 that the living will may be the first step towards the ultimate 
legalization of mercy killing. On the other hand, however, one can also 
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argue that since this legislation adds nothing which does not already 
exist in the law it cannot, therefore, be considered such an opening 
wedge but is, rather, a mere codification for clarification purposes of 
the existing state of the law. Between these extremes lies the truth. 
Adult persons of sound mind have a right to refuse medical treat-
ment unless some equal and countervailing rights of other persons 
would be substantially jeopardized by such a refusa1. 5 For example, it 
has been consistently held by the courts that the right of a pregnant 
woman to refuse medical treatment must give way to the unborn 
child's right to life. Under those circumstances, courts have consist-
ently overruled the mother's right to refuse medical treatment, even 
when it may flow from a First Amendment protection - namely, the 
free exercise of religion. 
Consequently, adult persons of sound mind may reject medical 
treatment even though the result may be their own death. Such a 
decision has not been construed either as suicide or euthanasia by 
most commentators in spite of the consistent confusion that the con-
cept of passive euthanasia causes. 6 The problem becomes particularly 
difficult in the situation where the person is either not competent to 
give consent, or is comatose or unconscious and unable to consent. 
These issues were recently litigated in three cases: the Quinlan case , 7 
the Saikewicz case 8 and the Dockery case. 9 In each of these cases the 
courts ultimately held that refusal to accept the treatm ent could be 
made on behalf of the unconscious or incompetent by the next of kin 
who had been appointed conservator or guardian. No statutory 
authority or guidelines existed in any of these three states where these 
cases were litigated. The courts made such decisions based upon the 
application of traditional rules of equity and their understanding of 
the medical-legal principles involved. 
States Pass Legislation 
In 1977, eight states attempted to close what is felt to be a legis-
lative gap by passing legislation variously described as Natural Death 
Acts or Living Will Acts or Right to Die Acts. There are at least 59 
other bills pending in 42 states. The purpose of this paper will be to 
analyze the eight bills which have been thus far passed in order to help 
clarify some of the issues and to determine whether or not such legis-
lation is beneficial as a solution to this problem. 
My own view is that the legislation is not beneficial and is indeed 
counter-productive. I say this because I see the solution as lying in the 
area of the patient-physician relationship - a highly personal relation-
ship and an area in which I do not like legislative intrusion unless it is 
absolutely impossible to otherwise solve or circumscribe a legal prob-
lem , which I do not believe to be the case. 
In each of the cases I have previously mentioned, the reasons given 
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by the court for the necessity of intruding into this physician-patient 
relationship in order to solve this problem are the fear of physicians 
and hospitals of malpractice suits and criminal prosecution. Yet, 
today, there are no reported cases of either criminal or civil liability 
being assessed against the doctor or hospital arising out of the termina-
tion of treatment for terminal patients .10 Why then do we have this 
extraordinary spate of legislative activity in an area where no liability 
exists on the books? Is it because liability is deemed probable and 
suits may be filed, or is it because of the activities of special interest 
groups such as the Euthanasia Society or the Society for the Right to 
Die? 
The Society for the Right to Die has been very active in pursuing the 
enactment of living will statutes throughout the nat ion . Perhaps this 
accounts for the fact that such legislation during 1976 and 1977 was 
introduced into almost all 50 state legislatures. The Society for the 
Right to Die publishes a legislative manual containing its own model 
statute which has been introduced into many legislatures. The manual 
also contains copies and analyses of the statutes introduced into the 
various states. 
The Society for the Right to Die is closely connected to the Eutha-
nasia Society and the Euthanasia Educational Council. It is this close 
relationship which has prompted many people to see the living will as 
the first step towards the ultimate legalization of euthanasia, which is 
currently classed as homicide. However, putting such speculation aside 
for the present, let us return to an .analysis of the legislation involved. 
As in the execution of any will, the major problem and cause for 
litigation (other than interpretation of the will itself) is the voluntari-
ness of the execution or the consent. Such is also the case for the 
living will as we will discuss shortly. 
A far more important problem created by these acts and one which 
would probably surprise its sponsors is that, in my opinion, living will 
legislation will inhibit rather than increase the physician's ability to 
solve with dignity and grace the problem of the dying patient. Any-
time a statute is passed regulating conduct and creating rewards and 
punishments for non-compliance, such an act has the effect of chilling 
or inhibiting similar conduct otherwise legal but now not in con-
formity with the act. Consequently, the effect of these acts will be to 
chill and inhibit otherwise lawful conduct of a physician in withdraw-
ing life-sustaining means unless such a living will has been made by the 
patient. If even 20% of the populace executes such living wills - a 
figure I doubt will be attained - still another 80% will reach the 
terminal never having executed such a document. 
The physician will probably assume that he cannot now withdraw 
life-sustaining measures unless he has a directive from the patient in 
compliance with the act. California has sought to avoid this problem 
by including Section 7193 , which indicates that the act does not 
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impair or supersede any legal right or responsibility a person may have 
to effect the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a lawful man-
ner. Few of the other statutes have dealt with the problem. 
A better approach of the legislature would have been to pass an act 
stating that life-sustaining measures may be withdrawn when this may 
be done in the judgment of the attending physician under usual and 
customary standards of medicine. Here is an example: 
Life-sustaining measures may be terminated by the attending physician 
when, in hi s judgment, based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
according to usual and customary standards of medicine, it is proper to do 
so. 
This would constitute an affirmative statement by the legislature 
that physicians can terminate useless treatment and thus presumably 
dispel the medical confusion on this point. 
It is understood that hospital aides, nurses or technicians who act 
upon a lawful order of a physician are not liable for doing so, and it is 
not necessary to say so in the statute. If the order itself constitutes 
malpractice, mayhem or murder and should have been known to be so 
by the aide or nurse, or is carried out by them negligently, then that is 
another matter. 
The grant of immunity to the treating physician, which is a univer-
sal aspect of these statutes, is most curious in these days of seeming 
mistrust of the medical profession. Immunity is probably granted to 
ensure physician support of these bills, but not even sacred immunity 
has been able to make the medical profession support such legislation. 
I think the reason is that most doctors handle terminally ill situations 
now without any of the mess or fuss brought about by this legislation. 
Most feel qualified to handle the situation and, if hospital cooperation 
and family support can be obtained, will have no difficulty - indeed, 
less difficulty with such situations without a statute than with one. 
In addition, customary methods and standards in medicine change 
continuously. There is no way that particularized medical practice can 
be legislated. Will we pass statutes saying when and under what cir-
cumstances an appendix mayor must be removed? The better 
approach seems to me to leave the determination of the customary 
standards of medicine in the hands of the physicians. If they overstep 
the bounds of what is proper, legally or morally, then society should 
act to correct this condition. The physician's judgment must be relied 
upon by society in these matters. Elements of that judgment can be 
controlled by statutes prohibiting unwanted conduct such as Section 
7188 of the California Act which "prohibits" mercy killing. But the 
homicide laws do this anyway. It is a misunderstanding of the current 
status of medical-legal principles which causes the confusion. Unfor-
tunately the California Natural Death Act has compounded those 
problems rather seriously . 
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Family Consent a Separate Problem 
Whether or not a physician obtains a consent from the family or 
next of kin for terminating life-sustaining measures is a separate prob-
lem involving freedom from potential suit. This is entirely distinct 
from the exercise of the physician's judgment in determining that the 
life-sustaining method should be terminated , or in obtaining an 
informed voluntary consent from the patient himself for the termina-
tion of treatment. As a matter of prudence, the physician should 
obviously obtain such consents from the family when the patient is 
unable to voluntarily consent. Such a consent at least precludes those 
who gave consent from maintaining an action . 
Voluntary consent is the difficult problem and the California 
statute does not make that problem any easier. In fact, it compounds 
it by 1) using, in Sections 7186 and 7188, language t hat conditions 
the validity of the directive to a voluntary consent given when the 
patient was of sound mind (How in the world can a physician know 
that?), and 2) not clarifying in Section 7191(b) that the conclusive 
presumption may not be rebutted by evidence of the unsound mind of 
the declarant at the time the directive was executed. In addition, 
Section 7190 conditions its immunity grant on compliance with the 
act. Presumably, failure to follow the act vitiates the immunity. 
Section 7191(c) aggravates the problem further by only giving 
"weight" to the directive (when the patient becomes a qualified 
patient subsequent to executing the directive) as evidence of the 
patient's directions, but then indicates that he " may " (read must now) 
consider other factors such as information from the family and even 
the totality of the circumstances. This section [7191(c)] destroys the 
entire utility of the act in its present form as far as the apparent intent 
of the legislature is concerned. This section is the one that will prob-
ably be applicable to most patients dying in a hospital. That is, most 
of these will be patients who have executed the directive previously, 
but have not re-executed it since becoming a qualified patient. For all 
these patients the directive will merely be a piece of paper indicating 
the desires of a patient with little or no legal significance. That is no 
more (and less effective) than what the patient could have accom-
plished anyway with a hand-written letter to a loved one. Such a letter 
would probably mean more to the attending physician anyway. A 
formalized directive will cause him endless worry and frustration won-
dering whether the declarant was of sound mind when the directive 
was executed, worrying about whether the directive has ever been 
revoked, calling his personal attorney for an opinion on his immunity, 
conferring with the hospital attorneys and discovering that they dis-
agree with his personal attorney (or vice versa), conferring with the 
hospital ethics committee only to discover that they disagree with the 
lawyers, and last, but not least, learning to his chagrin that the statute 
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requires him to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
execution of the document so that he can "justify effectuating the 
directive." In addition, Section 7191(a) mandates that the physicians 
determine that the directive complies with the law and if the patient is 
mentally competent, and the action to be taken is in "accord with the 
desires of the qualified patient," then the action may be taken. 
In plain language, this means that if the patient is competent and 
alert the doctor should disregard the directive and obtain an informed 
consent from the patient to terminate the treatment. If the patient is 
not competent and alert, then 7191(c) requires the physician to make 
an inordinate investigation into the surrounding circumstances con-
cerning the execution of that directive. Who needs such a statute? 
Certainly not the doctors. Nor does it help the patient or his con-
cerned family. 
As an example of the complexity thrust upon the shoulders of the 
attending physician by the California act, let me pose one illustration. 
Section 7191(a) states that prior to effecting a withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient pursuant 
to the directive, the attending physician shall determine that the 
directive complies with Section 7188. Section 7188 is the section 
which determines the correct form for the execution of the document 
and the form of the document itself. This section requires that the 
directive "shall" be signed by the declarant in the presence of two 
witnesses who are not related to him by blood or marriage and who 
would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant 
upon his decease under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto 
then existing, or, at the time of the directive, by operation of law then 
existing. How in the world is any physician supposed to know that the 
witnesses are not related to the declarant, nor are they getting any 
portion of his or her estate when he or she dies? Presumably Section 
7191(a) applies to a patient who is competent and can discuss such 
things with the physician or the witnesses are available to do so. In 
any event, why should the attending physician be involved in matters 
of this sort when his job is to take care of a human being who is in a 
terminal condition - certainly the most psychologically difficult time 
of most people's lives? This intrusion into the patient-physician rela-
tionship seems totally unwarranted and cannot, in the long run, help 
raise the quality of medical care or the relationship between physician 
and patient. 
Other States Passed Law 
The other seven states which have recently passed such legislation 
are Arkansas, North Carolina, New Mexico, Nevada, Texas, Idaho and 
Oregon. 
The Arkansas law differs substantially from the California Act. The 
Arkansas law contains only four sections. The first declares that every 
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person has a right to die with dignity and a right to refuse and deny 
the use or application of artificial, extraordinary, extreme, or radical 
medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong life. 
Alternatively every person has a right to request that such means be 
used to prolong his life as long as possible. Section 2 allows the execu-
tion of a will containing such a directive. 
Section 3 is a radical departure from the California bill in that it 
allows execution of such a directive by one person on behalf of 
another. This section allows a person to execute such a directive for a 
minor or an adult who is incompetent. The statute gives certain prior-
ities as to who may execute such a directive on behalf of a minor or 
incompetent. It begins by giving the right to either parent of the 
minor, or -to a spouse. If the spouse is unwilling or unable to act, then 
"his child" age 18 or over may act. However, if he has more than one 
child age 18 or over, then a decision may be made by a majority of 
such children . (Can one visualize a family of 7 children over 18 casting 
ballots on this issue?). If he is mentally incompetent, the directive can 
be executed by a legally appointed guardian provided that two physi-
cians state that extraordinary means would have to be utilized to 
prolong his life. The last section of the act grants immunity to the 
physicians or anyone else assisting. 
The North Carolina bill contains an addition to the right to a nat-
ural death - a definition of irreversible cessation of brain function. 
The North Carolina Act allows for withholding extraordinary means 
upon certain conditions if the declarant is determined to be terminal 
and incurable. It requires that the document be proved before a clerk 
or assistant clerk of the Superior Court who certifies that the wit-
nesses appeared before him and swore that they observed the declar-
ant sign this declaration and also swore that they were not related 
within the third degree to the declarant or to the declarant's spouse 
and that they would not be entitled to any portion of the estate of the 
declarant upon the declarant's death and that they were not a physi-
cian attending the declarant or an employee of an attending physician, 
or of a health facility in which the declarant was a patient, or of a 
nursing home or any group care home and that they had no claim 
against the declarant. The procedure for proving up the document 
before the clerk indicates that it may be accepted on the testimony of 
two witnesses or, if only one witness is available, then upon the testi-
mony of such witness and upon the proof of the handwriting of the 
witness who is dead or whose testimony is unavailable . The statute, 
unlike the Arkansas bill, specifically allows for revocation. Once again, 
the act grants immunity from civi l or criminal liability to the physi-
cian and all those who assist. 
The North Carolina bill, unlike most of the legislation in this area, 
also includes a definition of brain death. 
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The New Mexico bill is substantially similar to the model bill 
promulgated by the Society for the Right to Die. It includes other 
provisions which were borrowed from the California Act, but basically 
it, like the other statutes, allows for the execution of a document for 
the refusal of "maintenance medical treatment." It also contains a 
section allowing the document to be executed on behalf of a termin-
ally ill minor, but the execution of such document must be done with 
the same formalities as are required of a valid will under their Probate 
code. The statute allows for revocation, grants immunity to the physi-
cians and requires two physicians to certify to the terminal illness. 
The Nevada bill is similar in some respects to the California statute, 
but does not use the same terms or definitions. Again immunity is 
granted to the physician. 
The Texas bill is the same as the California bill. The Idaho bill is 
substantially similar to the California statute, as is the Oregon bill. 
Most Important Element 
The single most important element of each of these bills is the time 
when the directive becomes effective. It is this element of the statute 
which controls the entire act and prohibits the use of such legislation 
to foster mercy killing. Of course, the statute can be amended on the 
books at some later date to allow mercy killing, or, worse yet, can be 
"amended" in practice by those who have a mind to, to allow mercy 
killing now. 
The California Act allows the directive to become operative only 
when the patient is terminal, which is defined as a condition caused by 
injury, disease or illness which, regardless of the applications of life-
sustaining procedures would, within reasonable medical judgment, 
produce death and where the application of life-sustaining procedures 
serves only to postpone the moment of death of the patient. Such a 
carefully restrictive definition which obviously precludes mercy killing 
should be compared with the Arkansas bill, which is completely 
devoid of any such definitions and merely grants to every person a 
right to reject any means of artificial, extraordinary, extreme, or 
radical medical or surgical means or procedures calculated to prolong 
his life. 
The remaining acts require a terminal condition, which is usually 
defined as restrictively as is the California bill. 
For all but the Arkansas statute then, the time when the directive 
becomes effective (in the sense that it may be put into actual use) is 
the time when a person is in an incurably terminal condition where 
the use of extraordinary medical means serves only to prolong the 
moment of death. This definition is a reasonable time, if time there 
must be, when living will statutes become effective. 
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EXHffiIT A 
CALIFORNIA 
A_3060 ENACTED 1976 
In troduced by Assem bly m an Barry Keene, 2/ 13/ 76 
Passed by Assembly (43-22), 6117/76 
Passed by Sena te (22-1 4), 8 / 26/76 
Signed by Gov. Edmund G. Bmwn, Jr., 9/30/76 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO ENACT AS FOLLOWS: 
NATURAL DEATH ACT 
Sec. 7185 
This act sha ll be known and m ay be c ited as th e Natural Death Act. 
Sec . 7186 
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundam en ta l right to co ntrol the 
dec isions relating to the re ndering of their own medica l care , inc luding the 
decision to have li fe-susta ining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a 
te rminal cond ition. 
The Legislature further finds that modern med ica l technology has made 
possible the a rti fic ia l p rolongat ion of hum an life beyond natural limits. 
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The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting individual 
autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal condition may 
cause loss of patient dignity, and unnecessary pain and suffering, while providing 
nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the patient. 
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncertainty in the 
medical and legal professions as to the lega lity of terminating the use or 
application of life-sustaining procedures where the patient has voluntarily and in 
sound mind evidenced a desire that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn. 
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect, 
the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of Cali fornia shall 
recognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive instructing his 
physician to withh old or withd raw life-sustaining procedures in the event of a 
terminal condition. 
Sec. 7187 
The fo llowing defini tions shall govern the constructio n of this chapter: 
(a) "Attending physician " means the physician se lected by, or ass igned to, the 
patient who has primary responsibility for the treatment and care of the 
pati ent . 
(b) "Directive" means a written document voluntar il y executed by the declarant 
in accordance with the requirements of Section 7188. The directive , or a copy 
of the directive , shall be made part of the patient's medical records. 
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or intervention 
which utilizes mechanical or other artificia l m eans to sustain, restOl·e , or 
supplant a vital function, which, when applied to a qualified patient, would 
serve only to artificially prolong the moment of death and where, in the 
judgment of the attend ing physician , death is imminent whether or not such 
procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining procedure" shall not include the 
administration of medication or the performance of any medical procedure 
deemed necessary to a ll ev iate pain. 
(d) "Physician" means a physician and surgeon licensed by the Board of Medical 
Quality Assurance or the Board of Osteopathic Examiners. 
(e) "Qualified patient" means a patient diagnosed and certified in writing to be 
afflicted with a terminal condition by two physicians, one of whom shall be 
the attending physician, who have personally examined the patient. 
(f) "Te,-minal condition" means an incurable condition caused by injury, disease, 
or illness, which, regardless of the app lication of life-sustaining procedures, 
would, within reasonab le medical judgment, produce death, and wh ere the 
application of life-sustaining procedures, serve on ly to postpone the moment 
of death of the patient. 
Sec_ 7188 
Any adu lt person may execute a directive directing the withho lding or withdrawal 
of life-sustaining procedures in a terminal cond ition. The direct ive shall be signed 
by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses not related to the declarant by 
blood or marriage and who would not b e entitled to any port ion of the estate o f 
the declarant upon his decease under any will of the declarant or cod icil th ereto 
then existing or, at the time of th e directive , by operation of law then existing. In 
addition, a witness to a directive shall not be the attending physician , an employee 
of the attending physician or a health fac ili ty in which the declarant is a patient , 
or any person who has a cla im aga inst any pOl-tion of the estate of the declarant 
upon his decease at the time of the execution of the directive. The directive shall 
be in the following form: 
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DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS 
Directive made this ____ _ day of _ _ ______ ---\(month, year). 
I, being of sound mind , willfully, and voluntarily m ake known 
my desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged under the circumstances 
set forth below, do hereby declare: 
l. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease , or illness certified to 
be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the application of 
life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificjally prolong the moment 
of my death and where my physician determines that my death is imminent 
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized , I direct that such 
procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally. 
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use of such 
life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive shall be 
honored by my family and physician(s) as the final express ion 0 f my legal 
right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and accept the consequences from 
such refusal. 
3 . If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is known to my 
physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during the course of my 
pregnancy. 
4. I have been diagnosed at least 14 days ago as having a terminal condition by 
_______ , M.D. , whose address is , and whose telephone 
number is . I understand that if I have not filled in the physician's 
name and address, it shall be presumed that I did not have a terminal condition 
when I made out this directive. 
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the date filled in 
above. 
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotionally and 
mentally competent to make this directive. 
Signed ______________ ___ 
City, County and State of Residence 
The declarant has been p ersonally known to m e and I beli eve him or her to be 
of sound mind. 
Witness __________ _____ _ 
Witness _______________ __ 
Sec. 7188.5 
A directive shall have no force or effect if the declarant is a patient in a skilled 
nursing facility as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1250 at the time the 
directive is executed unless one of the two witnesses to the direct ive is a patient 
advocate or ombudsman as may be designated by the State Department of Aging 
for this purpose pursuant to any other applicable provision of law . The patient 
advocate or ombudsman shall have the same qualifications as a witness under 
Section 7188. 
The intent of this section is to recognize that some patients in skilled nursing 
facilities may be so insulated from a voluntary decision making role , by virtue of 
the custodial nature of their care, as to require special assurance that t hey are 
capable of willfully and voluntarily executing a directive. 
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Sec. 7189 
(a) A directive may be revoked at any time by the declarant , without regard to his 
mental state or competency, by any of the fo llowing meth ods: 
1. By being canceled, defaced, obliterated, o r burnt , torn, or otherwise 
destroyed by the declarant or by som e person in his presence and by his 
direction. 
2. By a written revocat ion of the declarant expressing his intent to revoke, 
signed and dated by t he declarant. Such revocation shall become effec tive 
only upon communication to the attending physician by the declarant or 
by a person acting on behalf of the declarant. The attending physician shall 
record in the patient's medical record the time and date when h e received 
notification of the written revocation. 
3. By a verbal ex pression by the declara n t of his in tent to revoke the 
dir e ctive. Such revocat ion s h al l b ecome effec tive only upon 
communication to the attending physician by the declarant or by a p erson 
acting on behalf of the declarant. The a ttending physician shall record in 
the patient 's medical record the ti m e, date, and place of the revocation and 
the t ime, date , and place, if different, of when he received noti ficat ion of 
the revocation. 
(b) There shall be no crimina l or civil liability on the part of any person for fa ilure 
to act upon a revocat ion made pursuant to this section unless that person h as 
actual knowledge of the revocation . 
Sec. 7189.5 
A directive shall be effective for five years fro m the date of execution thereof 
unless sooner revoked in a manner prescribed in Sec. 7189. Nothing in this chap-
ter shall be construed to prevent a declarant from reexecuting a directive at any 
ti m e in accordance with the formalities of Sec. 7188, including reexecution sub-
sequent to a diagnosis of a term inal condition. If the declarant h as exec uted more 
than one directive, such time shall be determined from the date of execution of 
the last directive known to the attending physician. If the declaran t becomes 
co matose or is rendered incapable of communicat ing with the attending physician , 
the directive shall remain in effect for t he duration of th e comatose condition or 
unti l such time as the dec larant's condition renders him or her able to com· 
municate with the attending physician. 
Sec. 7190 
No physician or health faci li ty which, acting in accordance with the requiremen ts 
of this chapter, causes the withholding or withdrawal of li fe -sustai n ing procedu res 
from a quali fied patient, shall be subject to civil liability therefrom. No licensed 
health professional, acting under the .direction of a physician, who participates in 
the withholding or withd rawal of life-susta ining procedures in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter shall be subject to any civil liability. No physician , or 
licensed h ealth professional acting under the direction of the physician, who 
participates in the withholding or withdrawal of li fe·sustaining procedures in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of any criminal act 
or of unprofessional conduct. 
Sec. 7191. 
(a) Prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal o f li fe-sustaining procedures 
from a qualified patient pursuant to the directive, the attend ing physician sh all 
dete rmine that the directive complies with Sec. 7188, and , if the patient is 
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mentally competent, t hat the directive and all steps proposed by the attending 
physician to be undertaken are in accord with the desires of the qualified 
patient. 
(b) If t he dec larant was a qualified patient at least 14 days prior to executing or 
reexecuting the directive, the directive shall be conclusively presumed, unless 
revoked, to be the directions of th e patient regarding the withholding or 
withdrawal of li fe-s ustaining procedures. No physician, and no licensed health 
professional acting under the direction of a physician , shall be criminally or 
civilly liable for failing to effectuate the directive of the qualified patient pur-
suant to this subdivision. A failure by a physician to effectuate the directive of 
a qualified patient pursuant to this division shall constitute unprofessional 
cond uct if the physician refuses to make the necessary arrangements , or fails 
to take the necessary steps, to effect the transfer of the qualified patient to 
another physician who will effectuate the directive of the qualified patient. 
(c) If the declarant becomes a qualified patient subsequent to executing the 
directive, and has not subsequently reexecuted the directive, the attending 
physician may give weight to the directive as evidence of the patient's direc-
tions regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures and 
may consider other factors, such as information from the affected family or 
the nature of th e patient's illness , injury, or disease, in determining whether 
the totality of circumstances known to the attending physician justify effec-
t uating the directive. No physician, and no licensed health professional acting 
under the directive of a physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing 
to effectuate the directive of the quali fied patient pursuant to this subdivision. 
Sec. 7192 
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from a qualified 
patient in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall not, for any 
purpose, constitute a suicide. 
(b) The making of a directive pursuant to Sec. 7188 shall not restrict, inhibit, or 
impair in any manner the sa le , procurement, or issuance of any policy of life 
insurance, nor sh all it be deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy of 
li fe insurance. No policy of life insurance sh all be legally impaired or inval-
idated in any manner by the withh olding or withdrawal of life-sustaining 
procedures from an insured qualified patient, notwithstanding any term of the 
pul icy to the con trary . 
(c) No physician, health fac ility, or oth er health provider, and no health care 
service plan, insurer issui ng disability insurance, self-insured employee welfare 
benefit plan, or nonprofit hospital service plan , shall require any person to 
execute a directive as a condition for being insured for , or receiving, health 
care services. 
Sec. 7193 
Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsi-
bility w hich any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of 
life-sustaining procedures in any lawfu l manner. In such respect the provisions of 
thi s chapter are cum ulative. 
Sec. 7194 
Any person w ho willfully conceals, cancels, defaces , obliterates, or damages the 
directive of another without such declarant's consent shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. Any person who , except where justified or excused by law , falsifies or 
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forges the directive of another, or will fully conceals or withholds personal 
knowledge of a revocation as provided in Section 7189, with the intent to cause a 
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures contrary to the wishes of 
the declarant, and thereby, because of any such act, directly causes life-sustaining 
procedures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to thereby be hastened, shall 
be subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide as provided in Chapter 1 (com-
mencing with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1 of the Penal Code. 
Sec. 7195 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve 
mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life 
other than to permit the natural process of dying as provided in this chapter. 
SECTION 2 
If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circum-
stances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applica-
tions of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or appli-
cation, and to this end the provisions of this act are severable. 
SECTION 3 
Notwithstanding Section 2231 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, there shall be 
no reimbursement pursuant to this section nor shall there be any appropriation 
made by this act because the Legislature recognized that during any legislative 
session a variety of changes to laws relating to crimes and infractions may cause 
both increased and decreased costs to local government entities and school dis-
tricts which , in the aggregate, do not result in significant identifiable cost changes. 
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